THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF IDENTITY PERCEPTION: AN ANALYSIS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF INSTITUTIONS

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Abstract

Formed through the influence of historical experiences, common beliefs, religions, languages and cultures, as in many other conflicts, identity perceptions are a root cause behind the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This study undertakes a careful investigation of these historical experiences in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with a focus on the state of national institutions in both nations in a comparative manner. These institutions play a strong role in nation-building process and identity perceptions, as such their examination reveals the current status regarding the incorporation of these institutions into the goal of nation-building.

The paper observes that the identity perception-induced conflicts are still the top agendas enough to throw the Middle East into disorder, with a constant potential for war. While the state of warfare between Israel and Palestine plays a crucial role in the formation of national identities, the identity perceptions increase the persistence of the conflict. Consolidation of identity perceptions is one of the most influential factors that shape the nation-building process. These identity perceptions are built on, consolidated and propagated via a variety of sources, such as societal beliefs about oneself and the "other", ideological and religious roots, educational or military institutions. Thus, these historical, social and cultural sources are the determining factor of this process. The extent to which these components are effectively employed during the nation-building process greatly impacts these nations' success in the identity-based securitization. The investigation concludes that Israel has been more effective in this process than Palestine.

Keywords: Identity Perception, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Middle East, Nation-Building Process, National Institutions.

1. Introduction

Perceptions formed by the interpretation of sensations and experiences give direction to human behaviors. The most important perception that affects human life by directing behaviors is identity perception. Although the perception of identity is unique to the individual, it emerges as a result of social convictions. The formation and change of these convictions require a long time. All historical experiences, common beliefs, religions, languages and cultures of societies have an impact on the formation of identity perception. The perception of identity affects and shapes the relationships of societies with other identities. That is why, the perception of identity has been a determining factor in the relations of societies for centuries.

The area in which the perception of identity is the most effective is "intractable (intensive) conflicts". Such conflicts can be characterized by their unsolvable, violent and zero-sum nature (Azar, 1985, 59-70; Bar-Tal, 1998, 22; Bar-Tal, 2000, 351-365; Goertz and Diehl, 1993, 147-171). As in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, these conflicts become inextricable with the difficult-to-change beliefs created by the perception of identity.

In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the efforts of the sides to marginalize each other and to raise people's national consciousness have a negative effect on the resolution of the conflict. This occupation-based conflict is also a conflict between Israel and Palestine nations. This conflict is supported by the perceptions of the sides from the past, and disparaging the other side is used as a means to legitimize it (Kriesberg, 1993, 418). This is undoubtedly in line with the nation-state project which is a product of the modern history. In this respect, although Israel is an exceptional country in every respect, it is a nation-state project that has been developed within the framework of the Zionist movement (Mert, 2008).

Israel, through public institutions, brings national consciousness to its people. Israel marginalizes the Palestinians in the process of its nation-building, facilitates the adoption of other perceptions by using its national institutions. Israel attempts to form an Israeli nation by using national symbols in its school textbooks, military and cultural fields. Israel has significantly increased its effectiveness both in the Middle East and in the world thanks to its effective institutions and the international activities, and successes of its intellectuals equipped with these institutions.

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On the other hand, Palestine does not have developed institutions compared to Israel, and for this reason, it tries to raise the consciousness of the nation by forming common beliefs among the Palestinian people. These opinions are based especially on the social distress produced in areas that Israel occupied after 1948. The history of the sufferings of the Jews dates back to the oldest times (Bar-Tal, 1998, 37-38). The Jews establish their righteousness on this past.

This paper deals with the Israeli and Palestinian identity-building in the historical process, and how these identities are injected into the public through national institutions. It contends that both sides' alienation of each other aggravates the conflict that greatly concerns the region and the world.

2. Israel's Societal Beliefs and Institutions

2.1. Israel's Societal Beliefs

Societal belief is the most important factor determining the character of the intractable conflicts, even though it is usually formed as a result of the common experiences of the people. It is also supported by institutions in order to bring people together on a common ground in the process of nationalization. The common belief of Jews who have been under pressure and exclusion everywhere they go to for centuries is based on "victimization". The pogroms[1] against Jews started since they were held responsible for the killing of the second Alexander in 1881. They led to the emergence of political Zionism with the idea that Jews should establish their own state. The Holocaust against Jews during the Second World War nurtured the idea of this victimization and was even considered to be their greatest proof of rightfulness. The anti-Semitic movements around the world have also supported the victim status of the Jews. In this regard, it is necessary to pay attention to what Theodor Herzl said:

"No one can deny the gravity of the situation of the Jews. Wherever they live in perceptible numbers, they are more or less persecuted. Their equality before the law, granted by statute, has become practically a dead letter. They are debarred from filling even moderately high positions, either in the army, or in any public or private capacity. And attempts are made to thrust them out of business also: 'Don't buy from Jews!'

Attacks in Parliaments, in assemblies, in the press, in the pulpit, in the street, on journeys -for example, their exclusion from certain hotels- even in places of recreation, become daily more numerous. The forms of persecution vary according to the countries and social circles in which they occur. In Russia, imposts are levied on Jewish villages; in Rumania, a few persons are put to death; in Germany, they get a good beating occasionally; in Austria, Anti-Semites exercise terrorism over all public life; in Algeria, there are traveling agitators; in Paris, the Jews are shut out of the so-called best social circles and excluded from clubs. Shades of anti-Jewish feeling are innumerable. But this is not to be an attempt to make out a doleful category of Jewish hardships (Herzl, 1946, 10)."

Zionism can be defined as the political philosophy of Israel. Zionism which is partly religious partly historical ideal,[2] is based on the thesis that the Jewish community has a right to land in a part of the Middle East, and that this land has been occupied by Palestinian Arabs for more than a thousand years. Zionism, by showing the prevalence of anti-Semitism in the world, bears the belief that everyone is an enemy to them for no reason. Zionists state that the Arabs tried to destroy Israel several times (in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973) with large armies and that Israel had to fight to protect itself in these wars. This idea is based on the belief that the Jews have had to defend themselves for years (Kelman, 1999, 585).

Yael Zerubavel expresses the ideas of Israeli society and their effects on events as follows: "The claim that they were the original owners of the region that belonged to the Jews 2000 years ago is also shown as a justified reason for being in the region (Zerubavel, 1995, 15-16)." According to the Jews, to establish a state in the lands belonging to them and to maintain it is their natural right. Even so, by making references to the Old Testament, they emphasize that the region is the land that was promised (the promised land) to them. By virtue of that, Jews are God's chosen people. Their exile all over the world since the Roman period is a temporary fate; with the coming of the Messiah, the Jews will return and gather again in their ancestral land, in Palestine.

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[1] Pogrom, which means "uprising" in Russian, is the massacres of the Jews by the civilian population. Law enforcement agencies also supported these massacres by condoning and actively helping them.

[2] Despite its religious references, Herzl's Zionism is not a religious project; it was a secular political project. As a matter of fact, both Herzl and Max Nordau, the second man of the Zionist movement after Herzl, and all the other Zionist leaders did not consider Judaism as a union of belief; they regarded it as the name of a race (Smith, 1982, 291-293).

Zionism emphasizes that Arabs did nothing for the development of the region and that Israel brought civilization to the region. This is the result of the claim that Jews are a superior race. Because of their superior race, they contributed to the development of every place they went, and at least brought vitality to the economic and commercial life. On the other hand, Arabs are primitive, savage, bloodthirsty, cruel and backward. Even though Israel does not want a war, the conflict is inevitable due to the security threat originating from these traits of Arabs. However, Jews are a pacifist people; peace represents an ideal for them. They are always ready to make peace with the Arabs. Unfortunately, because of the aggressive attitude of the Arabs peace is not possible (Ezrahi, 2000, 1-2). According to the Jews, the one not willing to make peace is the Arabs.

The claims that the Jews are "the chosen people" based on the superior race belief is another social belief. The Jews have been able to survive without losing their identities even in their 2000 years of exile; because they were equipped with superior qualities.[3] Regardless of what happened to them, they are able to exist with their courageous, hardworking and smart qualities.

Palestinians believe that the region belongs to them, in that they are the indigenous people of the region, and that with the establishment of the State of Israel they became homeless. In the 1948 war, 700,000 Palestinians became refugees. Most of them could not receive asylum from the neighboring states, so they had to live in refugee camps. For Palestinians, this is an indication that they are victims and Israel is responsible for their suffering.

In the process of nationalization, it is a common situation for the parties to create the other and to create a self-image by disparaging the other. The two sides make such definitions over each other in order to create a self-image as well as to justify the conflict. National institutions play an important role in this process.

2.2. Israel's Institutions and Zionism

The exile of the Jews, which began with the Roman invasion in the 1st century, ended in 1948 when they established their state in Israel. During this long period, the Jews were not adopted within communities they lived; moreover, they were seen as being responsible for many catastrophes.[4] On the top of this, large-scale pogroms were initiated against the Jews. One of the most important reactions to these pogroms in which many Jews were killed, came from Leo Pinsker, a Russian Jew.

Pinsker, in his article "Auto-Emancipation: A Warning to His Kinsfolk by a Russian Jew" states that the Jews do not have a safe life and emphasized that security can only be achieved through a collective awakening. Therefore, the Jewish national consciousness needed to be awakened. Only by awakening national consciousness could the Jewish people be able to establish their own state (Pinsker, 1882; Morris, 2001, 16-17). Although Pinsker advocated the establishment of a Jewish State, he did not provide any idea of where it would be established. In fact, according to him, North America could have been a good place for the Jewish State. As a result of the pogroms, it became clear that the Jews could not live in Russia. Because of this aspect, in 1914, two and a half million Jews immigrated to the United States of America and nearly 10,000 of them to British dominions and South America. Nearly 100,000 Jews also lived in Western Europe (Cleveland, 2008, 266).

Pinsker provided an ideological basis for the establishment of the state. Although there was no Jewish organization capable of realizing this ideal, the only hope for the remaining Jews in Russia was the establishment of a new state. This is why political Zionism (Jewish nationalism focused on Palestine) emerged in Russia and become organized in this manner (Cleveland, 2008, 267). The first organized institution was founded in 1884 under the name Lovers of Sion. This organization started its activities with

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[3] Herzl stresses that the actions against the Jews help the Jews to embrace their family tree: "Distress binds us together, and, thus united, we suddenly discover our strength (Herzl, 1946, 13)."

[4] Jews living in relatively good conditions in the Kingdom of Solomon in the 10th century B.C., were forced to live in difficult conditions after Solomon's death. They were adversely affected by the war between the Assyrians and the Egyptians. Then, they were deported to Babylon when Nabukadnezar, the King of Babylon, destroyed the Temple of Solomon in 586 B.C. The Jews were saved from captivity by Iranian Ahimened King Kiros II and they were the people of the Kingdom of Macedonia in the time of Alexander the Great. The hardest years for the Jews began in 70 A.D. They were forced to migrate to various parts of the Roman Empire when the son of the Roman Emperor Vespesianus, Titus, resurfaced the Temple of Solomon, and when they rebelled for a second time against the Roman Empire between the years 132 and 135. With the adoption of Christianity (due to the conflicts between the two religions) the situation of the Jews worsened. Marriage with Jewish men was banned in Spain early in the 300s; 1215 The Lateran Council obliged Jews, like Muslims, to wear special clothes. The Jews were declared "scapegoats" in the Great Plague Epidemic, which destroyed one-third of the population in Europe in the second half of the 14th century. For this reason, they were forced to migrate to Eastern Europe. The Jews were deported from Spain in 1492 and since 1516 they were forced to retreat to the neighborhoods surrounded by walls called ghettos (Brenner, 2012; Johnson 1988).

small land purchases in Palestine. During the 19th century, in Western Europe, Jews were granted certain rights pertaining to their legal freedom. These rights aimed to help Jews to be integrated into the society. Herzl was the leader of political Zionism in Europe, which started in Russia.

Herzl witnessed the famous Dreyfus Trial in 1895, when he was a Paris correspondent for the Neue Freie Presse.[5] The trial caused an anti-Semitic explosion in France. Influenced by the slogans, like "Death to the Jews", thrown in the streets, Herzl believes that the Jewish issue can only be solved by the establishment of a Jewish state (Herzl, 1946, 1). In his book which is called "The Jewish State" written in 1896, he argues that anti-Semitism is too deep to be abolished by law. The book is considered to be a recipe for the approaches of a nation that is thought to be "special" for how to establish a government; a manifesto with its audacity and accent. In other words, Herzl regarded the nation-state as a solution to the Jewish question and believed that it had to be established through decolonization (Herzl, 1946, 11; Shafir, 1992, 72-85).

Herzl was not a religious person; in particular, in the beginning he was not even interested in establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. At first, he was thinking about Argentina. But soon after, it became clear that the Jewish-Torah mythology is a powerful spirit source (Herzl, 1946, 15).[6] In this way, a privileged and highly nationalist Jewish identity could be created:

> "We are one people. Our enemies have made us one without our consent, as repeatedly happens in history. Distress binds us together, and, thus united, we suddenly discover our strength. Yes, we are strong enough to form a State, and, indeed, a model State. We possess all human and material resources necessary for the purpose (Herzl, 1946, 13)."

Herzl initiated a number of studies in Europe to support Zionism. He thought that the Jewish state could not be established without the help of a great state and without the financial support of the Jews in Western Europe. But the Jews that lived in the United States and Western Europe had a good position in the society thanks to dealing with trade for many years and the rights they were given. They thought that their position could be damaged by the support they would give to Zionism (Cleveland, 2008, 268-269). Thus, Herzl made several attempts to influence the British Parliament. In other words, Herzl, unlike Moses Hess and Leon Pinsker, carried the Jewish state issue to the highest diplomatic and political circles.

The first Zionist Congress was held in Basel in 1897. The congress decided to establish World Zionist Organization for the establishment of a state in Palestine. In 1916, with the singing of the Balfour Declaration,[7] the United Kingdom gave support to the settlement of Jewish in Palestine. Britain's main purpose was to secure the corridor to its colonies through the existence of a state in the region from which it could receive support. Starting with this date, the number of the Jewish immigrants to Palestine increased.

The Palestinian area located within the territories of the Ottoman Empire was left to England at the San Remo Peace Conference in 1920. Even though England tried to maintain the balance between the Arabs and the Jews in the region, the increasing number of Jewish immigrants prompted a stronger reaction from the Arab population. In the meantime, the Jews built many institutions in order to create the base of the new State of Israel. On May 14, 1948, following the withdrawal of Britain from the region the same year, the State of Israel was established.

The State of Israel was established within the framework of Zionist policy. But there was disagreement as to what the state institutions would be based on (Kimmerling, 1985, 85-86). Some Jews wanted Israel to be a Jewish State, so the regulations and practices within the state would be made in accordance with the Torah (Liebman, 1993, 278-279). Others favored a more secular state where religion was separated from the state. But most Israelis rather preferred to find a middle ground between these two options.

Within the State of Israel, there were Jews from many different parts of the world. The Jews from all over the world were given the right to immigrate to their homeland, Israel, by the Law of Return was passed by the Knesset, Israel's Parliament, on July 5, 1950. This situation required to ensure unity and solidarity among these people who came from different cultures (Meyer, 1997, 90-92). The most important aim was to give the awareness of being "Israeli" to those living under the roof of the State of Israel (Kimmerling, 1993, 410-411). In order to achieve this goal, the Yishuv institutions carried out many activities even before the

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[5] The trial of Jewish Captain Alfred Dreyfus, who was tried and sentenced to life imprisonment in December 1894 for allegedly giving French military secrets to the Germans, is an indication of France's particular paranoid feelings towards Jews.

[6] Despite the fact that the idea and identity of the nation is actually the result and drift of a modern secular process, the Jewish state which resulted in the establishment of Israel is in fact about to define a religious identity. Zionism, as a nation-state project and as a non-land nation project, has determined Palestine as the basis for the "homeland" based on religious resources (Mert, 2008).

[7] See the full text of the Balfour Declaration: (Online) http://www.mideastweb.org/feisweiz.htm, Date of Access: 30.06.2019.

foundation of the State of Israel. The state activities along with the army, educational institutions and cultural events became more systemic after the establishment of the State of Israel (Denzau and North, 1995, 25-26). These institutions have a great role in bringing national consciousness to the Israeli society.

Institutionalization and legitimization of institutionalization are the key elements of political and administrative transitions. To institutionalize a system or an organization is to routinely visualize it in the eyes of those who interact with it. Thus, the system or organization brings its own recognition to a value that is perceptible to those around it, even if it is difficult to empirically measure it.

2.2.1. Israel's Educational Institutions

The Jewish community had a Hebrew education system that was established by Yishuv in the field of education before it became a state. These Zionist educational institutions established in Palestine had reached an advanced level in the late 1920s. Educational institutions in Europe were taken as a model. National language and national history-based education in Europe have an important place in Zionist educational institutions. The new immigrants reaching to Palestine were trained in these schools with Zionist ideology. The main goal was to give new immigrants a feeling of unity and solidarity.

In the period following the official establishment of Israel in 1948, with the increase in migration to the region, these schools were inadequate in terms of meeting both personal and physical needs. It was necessary to turn to new organizations that could appeal to students with different cultural backgrounds. For this purpose, in the 1970s, the Jewish radical movements in Israel, in particular the Haredi movement, established a serious education network in Israel for the continuation of the pre-enlightenment Jewish education. This system, which has achieved significant success with the support of Israeli governments, involves serious organization in the backward Israeli towns and slums (Dağ, 2008, 43). Accordingly, education in Israel begins at an early age. The aim is to make socialization and to learn the language in the best way (İsrail Enformasyon Merkezi, 1997, 154). Pre-school education starts at the age of two and is free and compulsory for the five-years-olds in the kindergarten.

Children receive compulsory formal education after pre-school education.[8] The Israeli education system is shaped within the framework of the multicultural nature of the society. Schools in Israel can be classified as follows: the public schools, which are called Mamlachti and where the majority continue; the state-religious schools, which are called Mamalachti dati that focus on Jewish studies and emphasize tradition and conservatism; the Arab and Druse schools that emphasize the Arabic teachings and the history of Arab-Druse; and the private schools in international support that emphasize the teachings various religions (İsrail Enformasyon Merkezi, 1997, 154). Children between the ages of 6-16 years receive compulsory education in these school (primary school, grades 1-6; secondary school, grades 7-9; and high school, grades 10-12).

After the secondary school stage, while relatively unsuccessful students are guided for mastery, trade or another profession, successful students are encouraged to continue a higher education institution that are called Yeshiva. Students who have successfully completed Yeshiva take the university entrance exam named Badrut to study at the institutions of higher educations, which are Kollel.

Teachers in schools were people who had migrated from Eastern Europe and had a certain level of education. They were not experts enough in their subjects, but they served their best to spread the Zionist ideology. Historian Muki Tzur says: "The teachers were not experts in the Zionist revolution. They were the spokesmen of the revolution." This situation created the difference between the teacher and the educator. Teachers were experts in a particular subject in the schools. And educators were the teachers working in primary schools. The duties of the educators were to infuse the Zionist ideology to the children from an early age. The teachers also specialized in history, geography and literature, and taught Zionist ideology in these courses (Lomsky-Feder and Ben-Ari, 2000, 120-121). The pre-school teachers considered their work a religious mission. They aimed to help the children comprehend the pre-school Jewish teaching and determine a suitable life for it. According to Jonathan J. Halperin, the teachers' vision was to educate and love new immigrants as their own children, and to train them according to the Jewish traditions.

One of the greatest ideological tools used in the formation of national consciousness is textbooks. With the information given in the school books, students adopt the ideology that the state wants to spread. Textbooks had also a huge impact upon the spread of the Zionist ideology. Tel Aviv University professor, Daniel Bar-Tal had an examination of 124 textbooks taught in schools (Bar-Tal, 1998, 39-40). The analysis

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[8] In traditional Jewish education, they resisted against the education of girls because of Talmud and Halaha's opinion that women do not need training. The Haridis had to make concessions from this attitude due to the intense objections (Dağ, 2008, 43).

reveals a pattern in the definitions used in the books for the Arabs. The Arabs are defined as backward, non-civilized, murderous, bloodthirsty and primitive people (Kalman, 1998, 89-90). Because of these characteristics, they do not approach to peace-making and they threaten the security of the State of Israel.

The education of the Zionist ideology was given especially in history textbooks. History teaching had an important place in this respect. Until 1948, 42 history books were published. These books not only taught history, but also transcended the roots of the Zionist ideology. In his book "The Sabra", Oz Almog states that the books of history lessons emphasize two things in particular: First, the history taught was usually about the achievements of Jewish heroes. By referring to the heroes, the goal to show that the Jews had a common glorious history. For this, references were taken from Torah. But these references were historical, not religious. Second, it is the claim that Jewish culture is the cradle of the world culture. This claim suggests that the Jews had developed an advanced civilization and took this civilization wherever they went (Almog, 2000, 26-27).

In addition, the term "history of the nation of Israel" was used instead of the term "Jewish history" in the books. Even this usage reveals that the desired nation is to be formed by embracing "lsraeli" identity rather than the "Jewish" one. In order to achieve this, three basic ideas have been dominated by history books:

1. Zionism is the only solution to the problems that the Jews have suffered so far.

2. The Jews have made great cultural and intellectual contributions to human history.

3. The Jews are "blessed people". Because despite centuries of oppression and persecution, they managed to survive and to preserve their identity (Almog, 2000, 32).

The aim these ideas aimed to achieve was that the people who are educated with these thoughts are at the world through the Zionist window. In the literature classes, essays that exalt Zionism are printed, and the day of the Balfour Declaration and the days devoted to Jewish leaders are celebrated in schools to create a common system of values.

The more loyal educated children's thoughts towards Israel become, the higher their adverse attitude towards Palestinians will rise, when they come across books containing information about Palestinians. Adir Cohen, in his book named "An Ugly Face in the Mirror", revealed a research conducted at a school in Haifa (Cohen, 1985, 128-129). In the study, 5 questions were asked to the students in the style of "How do you recognize an Arab?"

The results of the study are impressive. 75% of the students identified the Arabs as murderers, kidnappers of children, criminals or terrorists. 80% said that the Arabs have dirty and scary faces. 90% of the students said that Palestinians have no right in the region. These thoughts gradually affect the perceptions and behavior of the society. In fact, Michel Warschawski supports the above judgment in his study, revealing the gravity of the situation through slogans on the walls and posters in Jerusalem in 2002. Slogans such as "Exile the Arab enemies!", "A Jew cannot betray Jerusalem.", "Holocaust to Arabs!", "Soldier, you are my brother.", "Either they or we transfer (transfer in Hebrew meaning an ethnical purification, wiping, cleaning)" show the extent to which the policies pursued are influential on the people, and it is also very difficult to establish a peaceful process between the two communities (Warschawski, 2006, 36-38).

2.2.2. Israel Defense Forces

Before 1948, Yishuv's defense was provided by the semi-legal organization Haganah. After the establishment of the State of Israel, Haganah was legalized as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The importance of the IDF for Israel, which was established in a short period of two weeks ensuing the establishment of the State of Israel (The Israel Defense Force, 2013) and has been based on compulsory service implementation since then, is of great importance for Israel (WRI Report, 2003, 3). This is because the most important goal is to provide security for the Israeli State, which is constantly exposed to Arab attacks.[9] Besides ensuring the national defense, the IDF has many roles in sociological and economic terms (Kimmerling, 1993, 13-15). Because the army is not only the army of the state, but also of the people. The army is intertwined with the people.[10]

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[9] The security objectives of the Israeli Defense Forces: to defend the existence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the State of Israel; to create a deterrent force for all enemies; and to counter all kinds of terrorist acts that threaten daily life (İsrail Enformasyon Merkezi, 1997, 73).

[10] This put Jewish society under the influence of militarism and led to the establishment of military service to a sacred status. As a matter of fact, in Israel, soldiers became exempt from all kinds of laws and controls over time (Warschawski, 2006, 31-32).

In Israel, every Jew is required to do military service, except for the over-Orthodox Yeshiva students and some prisoners.[11] In addition, there is also a significant number of Druze in the Israeli army. In Israel, all men and women who meet the requirements are drafted when they turn 18. While men do compulsory military service for a period of three years, women are compelled to 20 months (IDF Background Information, 2013). Military service can be suspended for a while for those who continue their education in higher education institutions. Military service also includes new immigrants to Israel. In this respect, new immigrants are expected to perform military service for a certain period in accordance with their age and their individual circumstances.[12] Apart from the conflict, male and female soldiers all take part in the duties of technicians, communication and intelligence specialists, combat instructors, mapping engineers, administrative personnel, supplies providing personnel, computer operators, physicians, lawyers and so on during their military service period.

Every individual who completes the compulsory military service in Israel is registered to a reserve unit. After the demobilization, men are recruited as reserve soldiers for a maximum of 39 days each year until the age of 51; this period can be extended in case of emergency.[13] And also women are called to serve as reserve soldiers until the age of 24 (Conscientious Objection, 2003).[14]

For the Jews desiring to remain permanently in the army service such as profession, Israel Defense Forces can provide positions. IDF, provides convenience and support to many people who want to continue their education in this direction and also to the people who choose military carrier as a profession. IDF covers all costs of those people within the scope of their duties. And also, IDF is closely involved in the integration process of the soldiers who migrated and joined the armed forces, facilitating the process by offering them Hebrew language training and similar programs (İsrail Enformasyon Merkezi, 1997, 74).

Uniforms in the Israeli army are not flashy. There is also no a strict hierarchical order. The aim is to unite the soldiers in a sense of equality. That's why, the IDF is defined as a "nation-builder", as a school that provides a sense of unity and solidarity (Lomsky-Feder and Ben-Ari, 2000, 40).

Another function of the IDF is to teach Hebrew especially to new immigrants and those who do not have sufficient opportunities. Trainings are also organized for organized for the integration of migrants. Hebrew and basic mathematics courses are taught in courses. Additionally, history and geography courses are also available. There are also regulations for the Yeshiva subjects who want to continue their religious studies in the army (Lomsky-Feder and Ben-Ari, 2000, 41-42).

In these lessons, it is ensured that people from all social classes of life meet in a common denominator within the army. Economic, cultural and ethnic differences are lost under the umbrella of the army and the sense of unity and solidarity is reinforced (Kimmerling, 2000, 220-222). The soldiers can even find the people they will marry in the army. The families of permanent soldiers often come to visit their children, and this strengthens the family ties. Families are informed about the developments in the army following their visits to the army.

After the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the IDF has increased its influence on the Israeli foreign policy. The IDF has become one of most important institutions of Israel. It played an effective role on the nation-building process of the State of Israel. With the success of teaching the national language to the public and of dissolving all the differences within the society in the "Israeli pot", it gained the consciousness of the "Israeli nation" (Lomsky-Feder and Ben-Ari, 2000, 3-5).

2.2.3. Israel's Foreign Policy

Israel's foreign policy bears the traces of the experiences of Israel until the year 1948, when it was founded, and the wars it fought against the Arabs after its establishment. Founded by Jews who have been

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[11] In Israel, Jewish clergy and rabbi candidates are exempted from military service because of their privileged and legitimate position. Although the general rules on military service in Israel (military terms, exemption conditions etc.) have been introduced in the Defense Service Law adopted on 1 October 1949, they have undergone certain changes in the process9 (Payne, 2010, p. 30); In Israel, Arab-Israelis are not allowed to be soldiers for political reasons (Exemption from Military Service, 2013).

[12] New immigrants are given an adaptation period of 2 years. However, this does not mean that the new immigrants will not be called for military service during this period (Conscientious Objection, 2003).

[13] The people who are regularly called for training and service in order to be able to quickly join their units from all over the country in the event of a war or crisis form the reserve force of the Israeli Defense Forces (İsrail Enformasyon Merkezi, 1997, p. 73); Israel has tried to reduce the burden of reserve military service since the 1980s. In this direction, while women are not called for reserve training; the age limit obligations of the reserves that have served in a combat unit for men have been reduced to 45. For men, the age limit for being called to reserve training is 35 (İsrail Enformasyon Merkezi, 1997, 74; Conscientious Objection, 2003).

[14] Women who are married or have children are not invited to reserve military service (Payne, 2010, 32).

permanently excluded and deported in historical process, has led to the further mobilization and complexity of the Middle East, which is constantly in the spotlight for political, economic and religious aspects.

Dominated by the perception of "Never Again!", Israel's foreign policy had formed according to the required security parameters. Israelis, who are in a continuous perception of being surrounded, pursue policies in order to eliminate the threats to Israel's existence both in the region and internationally. In accordance to this purpose, Israel's foreign policy is carried out as an extension of Israel's defense policy. Therefore it is considered as a supra-political issue (Tür, 2008, 57).

> "Foreign policy is often created and implemented in secrecy and under the control of the government led by the prime minister. Foreign policy is largely the continuation of defense strategies and is relatively independent of politics (Tür, 2008, 57)."

One of the founding elements of Israel's foreign policy is Judaism (Tür, 2008, 56). One of the basic concepts that form the basis of Israeli foreign policy, is important for the understanding of Israeli politics and foreign policy. The main objective of the determined foreign policy is to deal with and eliminate the existential threats that Israel is considered to face in the region and international system. In other words, the idea that Israel was established as a peaceful democracy in its historical territory, and was surrounded by hostile states that did not accept its existence, compelled the country's foreign policy to develop as a part of and complementary to its defense policy. This process has the ability to keep the national consciousness alive, and thus, enable the Jewish nation to interlock. According to Brecher, Judaism is the most important factor in shaping Israel's foreign policy and the whole political culture is formed within this framework. The Jewish character of Israel has permeated "ideas, feelings and behaviors" in the country (Brecher, 1972, 229). It is generally accepted that "the consciousness of being Jewish" creates a general behavioral attitude among the elites of the country." These elites are trying to keep "the consciousness of being Jewish" in the people alive, just as Herzl is trying to do.

3. Palestinian Nationalism and Palestine Societal Belief

When defining the "Palestinian identity", it is difficult to talk about a national unity. The challenge is that more than half of the population are scattered throughout the world, especially the Middle Eastern countries, and there are several different Palestinian lives that do not often interact with each other. The lack of sovereignty of Palestine throughout history is another important factor in the lack of national identity.

This process, which hampered the formation of national myths, anthems, stories, and national history, delayed the Palestinians' gathering in a certain territory for a common future. The attitudes of the colonial powers that ruled the region also contributed to this process. The colonial powers of the region, Britain and the United States, have ignored the identity of the community by calling the people of the region not as Palestinians but as non-Jewish communities in Palestine.[15]

The self-expression of the Palestinians is a reaction to both the Jews who flocked to Palestine from the 1880s and the ideological statements of the Zionist organizations about Palestine. The formation of Palestinian identity consciousness is intertwined with their struggle for existence. Therefore, it is "an identity of reaction" and/or "an identity of resistance" with the anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish discourses (Khalidi, 1997, 17-18). In the words of Joanne Murphy, "The development of a Palestinian identity and achievement of a distinctive nationalist spirit have become one of the most defining characteristic of the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict and have served as a physical and emotional seeds of the broader Arab-Israeli hostility (Murphy, 1999, 84)."

The region, which was under the auspices of the Ottoman Empire in the beginning, was left to the British mandate after World War I, and clashes started between Jews and Palestinian nationalisms in the region. Due to the emergence of bloody conflicts, the British Mandate remained incapable of reacting, and handed over the region and the problem to the United Nations in 1947. The establishment of Israel in 1948 within the framework of the UN's Taksim Plan in 1947, although the Plan was rejected by the Arabs, led to a series of arduous struggles and wars between Arabs and Israelis. Parallel to the foundation of Israel, it can be said that there has been a strong trend, which is described as the birth of Palestinian nation identity.

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[15] Even though, the US recognized certain political rights of the Palestinians in the Camp David Treaty signed in 1978, no concrete steps have been taken to recognize national existence. The most important fact used in this agreement for the Palestinian national existence is the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" (Khalidi, 1997, 22).

Nakba[16] represents a common pain that holds Palestinians together that have to live under difficult conditions in exile, in the West Bank and Gaza. Pointing out a mutual purpose and a general enemy, Nakba helps with the formation of the concept of the Palestinian national identity. In other words, Palestinians began to imagine themselves as a nation with the establishment of Israel.

In contrast to Israel, the absence of elements such as national institutions, museums, archives, documents and national holidays required to establish Palestine's national identity makes the emergence of Palestinian identity difficult. As a matter of fact, perceptions in this direction among Palestinians are mostly shaped through prominent biographies and individuals. For Palestinians, the question of identity is closely related to the reconstruction of one's subjectivity (Sa'di, 2002, 176).

The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which took Nakba as a point of departure and created stories of the modern Palestinian commando movement and glorifying martyrdom, played an important role in this formation. Despite the disadvantages of being deprived of state institutions, the PLO has been effective in using radio and journalism effectively. The PLO divides the process "before" and "after" Nakba; it refers to return to essence by processing it in photographs, pictures and novels. The period before Nakba is associated with love, innocence and youthness, while the period after Nakba is correlated with grief, defeat and self-alienation (Sa'di, 2002, 187). Carol Bardenstein draws attention to the tree symbol in Palestine and states that the roots of trees are exaggerated and firmly attached to the soil. And this symbolizes the return home (Bardenstein, 1998, 148).

The great defeat of the Arab states in the 1967 War damaged the Arab League. In this war, the Arab states, whose territories were occupied, offended for themselves and were in trouble of rescuing the occupied territories.[17] After this moment, the Palestinians thought that their salvation could not be realized by other states but by their own hands[18] (Khalidi, 1997, 197-198). Palestinian nationalism distinguished itself from Arab nationalism and attempted to create a Palestinian nation. But the absence of a Palestinian state and the lack of a leader to lead the Palestinians hinder their nationalization process.[19] Despite the fact that there are Palestinian people who live in refugee camps, it is still questionable whether there is a Palestinian nation (Bowker, 2003, 160-162). But all Palestinians have a common "other". They have common grievances and common pains. They all want to go back to their homeland. If all of this is organized programmatically for the establishment of Palestinian nationalism, the Palestinian nation is likely to emerge.

Palestinian nationalism is stronger among the Palestinians who are living in Israel. With the Israeli invasion of Gaza and the West Bank after the 1967 War, Palestinians who live in Israel became more closely connected to their families and relatives. It leads to the remembrance of their Palestinian roots. They were also influenced by Israel's efforts to create a nation consciousness, and they attempted to claim their own identity (Zerubavel, 1995, 340). Although Israel wants to prevent the Palestinians from receiving higher education, many Palestinians take part in a higher level of education. Educated and mindful Palestinians have contributed greatly to the development of their nationalism. Therefore, it is a possibility that the person to become the national leader of the Palestinians and form a Palestinian nation might emerge from the Palestinians living in Israel.

Another important issue for the Palestinian nationalism is institutionalization. Institutionalization is vital to political development and is therefore an important variable in the structural evolution of Palestinians. Today, it is possible to conclude that in the occupied territories, there is a process of institutionalization that finds its roots in the layers of institutional development that characterizes the political evolution of the Palestinian society. This process does not necessarily have to be linear, but each of these structures gains a number of forms that will begin to determine the structure of the civil and political

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[16] The traumas created by the establishment of Israel and its subsequent developments on Palestinians, which is called "Disaster (Nakba)" by the Palestinians, shaped the social memory of the Palestinians. For the Palestinians, Nakba symbolized as a "memory area (lieux de memoire)" where memory crystallized and concealed itself at a particular historical moment (Nora, 2007, 144).

[17] In this process, many Arab states have used the Palestinian issue as a tool to implement their nationalist policies. This delayed the formation of Palestinian identity. On the other hand, the Pan-Arabism movement led by Jamal Abdul Nasser, aiming to unite the Arab world, delayed this process. Nasser, despite promising Palestinians freedom and supporting Palestinians, has not succeeded in this. The Palestinian awakening and resistance constituted the base cadres with the left and student movements, which have become widespread in the world under the leadership of the PLO. As a matter of fact, the acceptance of the PLO as a representative of the Palestinians in the 1993 Oslo talks has been a significant success in terms of recognizing the Palestinian identity.

[18] In this period, Golda Meir made the sharpest statement by saying that Palestinians did not actually exist (Khalidi, 1997, 164).

[19] The most important factor in preventing the formation of Palestinian identity is the Zionist movement. The Zionist movement is engaged in activities to build an Israeli identity from one side, while on the other side it is in the process of preventing Palestinians, who claim to be in the region, from gathering around an identity. Instead of bringing the concept of Palestine into the foreground of the concept of Arabs, the Palestinian people tried to make them belong to other Arab countries.

society that surrounds their world. It should not be forgotten that "Once institutions are in place, they can assume a life of their own by taking social resources, socializing individuals and even transforming the nature of civil society itself (Krasner, 1984, 240)." However, the outcome of a project to build a Palestinian state will be seriously attributed to the success or frustration of the Palestinian institutionalization.

4. Conclusion

The basis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which can be expressed as an example of intractable conflicts, is that the two nations have a sense of securitization on each other. In this identity-based securitization, the parties are supported by their perceptions from the past and often try to legitimize the other party by disparaging them. At this point, the effectiveness of the institutions of the two nations is the determining factor. It can be said that Israel is more effective than Palestine is this regard. Undoubtedly, the position and place occupied by the Jews in the life of the West is also important, but it will be a cliche to say that it is "thanks to the West and the United States". At this point, its effective institutions and international activities and achievements of the intellectuals with the backing of these institutions are very important. This opens the way for Israel to become more active both in the Middle East and in the world. For instance, there are very few Arab intellectuals whose names are heard in Europe and America, and only a few of them are Muslims. However, it is possible to name many Jewish intellectuals and Jewish opinion leaders in many parts of the world and in very key position. When regarded from a historical perspective, Jews have been able to maintain political and commercical key positions without being assimilated by any other culture or nation since 11th-13th centuries even after Christ and until Romans expelled them from the Holy Land in 70 B.C. They were able to balance the anti-Semitic pressure on them by putting their talents and wealth on a scale. The power and the importance of their historical accumulation cannot be overlooked. This is one of the most important psycho-sociological supporting factors of Israel. Israel owes this to its institutions.

Unlike Israel, there is no homogeneity among Palestinians, similar to other Arab states, and this is very natural. They lack a pattern of historical experiences from which to derive a common history or an identity construction; in turn, no framework above their citizenships exists for the construction of a nation-state. Thus, the homeland on which they live is not nation-states in that sense. They emerged mostly through the limits drawn by the Western states, by the leadership of a western-leaning ruler or whoever secured the best cooperation with the West. Although the Pan-Arabist movements that emerged in certain periods are very important for the emergence of an Arab identity, in the emerging identity, leaders also suffered from the renunciation of leadership position (Davişa, 2004, 230-231).

Similarly, the experience of the United Arab Republic and the experience of Nasser's leadership in promoting an Arab identity could not ultimately go beyond the will of the rulers. The leaders of the masses who do not care to be a nation-state on these unnatural borders have not created a homogenous idea. As much, the events that emerged in Tunisia in December 2010 and have been influential in many countries in the region over time, known as the Arab Spring clearly demonstrate the point above.

The situation worsens when it comes to the Palestinians. Given the multiple identities of the Middle East, nationalism has a high potential to create problems in the Middle East in the future. In addition to the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is clear that new, potential conflicts to rise in the Middle East will make the region worse. Therefore, first of all, a more constructive attitude should be taken rather than producing negative definitions and perceptions against the identity of the other. As we have seen in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the perceptions of the identity of the parties increase the intensity of the conflict. Nation-building institutions' perception is feeding the unresolved conflicts by making the society's perception more radical. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is difficult for the peace agreements to be concluded without changing the negative perceptions of the parties.

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